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East Timor Independence

East Timor Independence

East Timor Independence?

Contents.

. Introduction .. 3

. Ethnological origin, demography and policy . 3

. Before and after the arrival of the Europeans .. 6

. Japanese occupation during World War II 7

. The Portuguese colonial empire .. 8

. Indonesian invasion .. 10

. Introduction to Indonesia . 12

. Independence of Indonesia and Sukarno 13

. Formation of East-Timorese political associations 17

. The parties . 18

. Australian support . 21

. USA admits Timorese right to self-determination .. 23

. Indonesia admits independence . 23

. Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portugese

Republic on the Question of East Timor .. 24

. Conclusion 26

Introduction.

It is not easy to write with feigned calm and dispassion about the

events that have been unfolding in East Timor. Horror and shame are

compounded by the fact that the crimes are so familiar and could so easily

have been halted by the international community a long time ago.

Timor, the Malay word for "Orient", is an island of the Malay

Archipelago, the largest and easternmost of the Lesser Sundas, lying

between parallels 8 deg. 17' and 10 deg. 22' of south latitude and

meridians 123 deg. 25' and 127 deg. 19' of latitude east from Greenwich. It

is bathed by the Indian Ocean (Timor Sea) at South, and Pacific Ocean

(Banda Sea) at North and has an oblong configuration in the direction of

southwest -- northeast. The island is surrounded by the Roti and Saval

islands through the Roti Strait, by the Lomblem, Pantar and Ombai islands

across the Ombai Strait and by Kissar isle to the northeast. Southwards,

Australia dists about 500 km, and 1000 km separates the southwest point of

Timor from Java.

The total area of Timor is of 32 350 sq km, measuring the maximums of

470 km in length and 110 km in width. About 480 km wide, and a surface of

450 000 sq km, the Timor Sea which is divided between the two territories,

opening west into the Indian Ocean and east into the Arafura Sea, part of

the Pacific Ocean.

The territory of the island -- East Timor-- of which Portugal was

recognized administrative power by United Nations, occupies an estimated

area of almost 19 000 km, and comprises the eastern half of the island,

with 265 km in length and 92 km of maximum width and an area of 16 384 km

and the enclave of Ocussi-Ambeno that dists 70 km from Batugadi, with 2 461

sq km and a coastline 48 km long. Still part of East Timor is the island of

Ataero (or Pulo-Cambing) with 144 sq km, just 23 km northwards of the

capital Dili and the tiny isle of Jaco with 8 sq km, being the oriental

extreme of East Timor just ahead of Tutuala.

Ethnological origin, demography and policy.

There are 12 ethnic groups in East Timor each of which has its own

language: 9 Austronesian language groups - Tetum, Mambai, Tokodede, Kemak,

Galoli, Idate, Waima'a, Naueti; and 3 Papuan language groups - Bunak,

Makasae, Fatuluku. The Tetum live in two separate geographic areas within

East Timor. A simplified version of the Tetum language was utilised in Dili

by the Portuguese as a lingua franca. This language has spread throughout

East Timor so that Tetum, in its original or simplified form, came to be

spoken by about 60% of the population. Though widespread, it is not

understood by all.

One of the first references to the natives of East Timor is expressed

in the description that in 1514 the Portuguese Rui de Brito sent to king D.

Manuel. In our free transcription, he wrote in these terms: Timor is an

island beyond Java, has plenty sandalwood, plenty honey, plenty wax, hasn't

junks for navigating, is a big island of kaffirs.

The `kaffir' is meant to refer to the black and of troubled hair.

Timorese what, not being untrue, was an imprecise observation as the type

was to be found only in some regions, specially in Ocussi, and generically

in West Timor.

From the antrophological point of view, the island arouses the upmost

scientific interest such is the heterogeneity of it's people.

For centuries the East Timorese had been farmers, living in scattered

hamlets and eating what they grew. Only a few coastal East Timorese were

fishermen. Trading and shop keeping had for generations been in the hands

of the Chinese. East Timor is extremely mountainous, so the majority of

East Timorese had always lived in isolation, far from towns and foreign

influences, tied to their fields and animistic practices. In spite of

centuries of Catholic missionary work by the Portuguese, in 1975 animists

still numbered as much as 72 % of the population. The local Timorese kings

still played an important part in their lives and allegiances, whilst

interference from Portuguese administrators and military was almost non-

existent.

In the period between World War 2 and the 1975 Indonesian invasion, a

number of East Timorese managed to gain an education in the colony's few

schools. Some were mestizos, of Timorese and Portuguese parentage, others

were Timorese from traditional ruling families, but the majority were

native Timorese who gained their education through the Catholic minor

seminary. The emergence of this small educated elite in the 1960s and 1970s

ensured that, when the Portuguese left East Timor in 1975, these people

with schooling, and nationalist aspirations, became the territory's

leaders.

Politically, socially and ethnologically Timorese differ amongst

themselves in groups. There is the division in independent sucos

(kingdoms), the distinction between the Atoni tribes of the Servian

kingdom, in West Timor, and the Belos of the Portuguese territory, groups

such as the Firacos, ethnic designation adopted by the Timorese in between

Baucau and Luca, or the Caladi which are the inhabitants of the central

crest , Malays and non-Malays, so many "sucos" and more than twenty

languages and dialects, the contribution of the exogamy, of parties

irreconcilable. In conclusion, that is the expression of a relative absence

of bio-ethnic unity of the populations.

The history of a People and their Culture voted to banishment from

their motherland, the eastern half of an island, former Portuguese colony

is the much unknown. Timor lies in South East Asia enclosed in world's

largest archipelago. That is Indonesia, which gave it's name to the

Republic constituted after the dutch withdrawl. Since the beginning,

Indonesian governments have experienced resistance coming from independist

movements of various islands which claim ethnical and cultural diveristy

from the predominant Javanese type. Nonetheless they were continuously

silenced thus unable to internationalize the situation to a stage that

would force foreign intervention. When it became inevitable, in that single

exception of the western half of New Guinea, the autodetermination of the

papuans in favour of an integration in Indonesia was observed as an

Indonesian orchestrated act, and remembered until today as the darkest

episode in the history of UN.

Indonesia couldn't either afford the regional instability that the

prospect of a small nation rising in between the empire would arouse .This

solitary piece of territory and it's inhabitants had to be sacrificed for a

hugger cause.

Portugal which's vast colonial possessions had once made the country

great, with times had become responsible for it's retardment. The drawling

of the situation was put to an end with a successful coup d'etat, in April

'74, which engaged a national revolution ceasing dictatorship and commited

to decolonization. Meanwhile, if East Timor, due to distance and expense,

was already the most forgotten colony, less attention it was given towards

the definition of it's future as the longed changes in the metropolis

didn't avoid internal deviations and contradictions. It brought instability

to the government of the country and the urgence to lay the basis of

democracy.

For Indonesia however, the solution was announced: annexation by any

terms. As it couldn't be done without cover-up, the Indonesian accounted

the "ignorance" of Timor's closest neighbor, Australia, offering access to

the Timor Gap for oil. The maintenance of economic and institutional

relations was (is) too important. Necessary non-interference from

superpower USA was also naturally reached. Having the Americans weakened

their position in South East Asia after Vietnam, Indonesia was regarded as

the last great bastion of anti-communism in the region, essentially in

those years for reasons of military strategy as we'll see ahead. Thus

friendly relations were very important to preserve.

So, in name of political, economical and military goals, with two

major countries making it possible for the pretender of East Timor, and

before the impotence of Administrative Power Portugal, Indonesia invaded in

December '75, interrupting a process of decolonization in course. The

action was promptly condemned by the United Nations. Although in face of

International Law, and of the most elementary human rights, Indonesia is

regularly criticized by the International Community, East Timor remains

still insignificant to put at stake superior governmental interests.

As the case of East Timor becomes more of a serious arrow nailed in

the flank of Indonesia's diplomacy, Jakarta multiplies efforts to gain

votes amongst countries who normally vote against in the sessions of UN,

the mediator of the discussions between Portugal and Indonesia (without

Timorese representation) to avoid further embarrassments that have resulted

uncomfortable for its economic relations, and desirable leading role

amongst the Non-Aligned Movement, the same that combated colonialism.

Nevertheless the same policy persists for Timor. As if once the

annexation has been carried out it urges by all means to prove the

righteousness of such action.

For the last 19 years, an excess of 200 000 Timorese have been killed

by the Indonesians. The Resistance arms itself with the weapons captured

from the enemy. Women, the aged and the children are concentrated in camps

where they do forced labour and many starve to death. Suspects are

tortured, spanking and sexual abuse are constant, many women have been

sterilized. Family members are deliberately aparted. Transmigration

programs project the definite dissolution of the Maubere People.

Before and after the arrival of the Europeans

Previous to the European interference in the indigenous scheme of

life, the island of Timor was inhabited by barbarian people that couldn't

write but used iron and was already agricultural. Industry was limited to

the fabrication of cotton cloths with which they covered themselves and the

commerce reduced to the trade of wax and sandalwood for certain products

that brought to Timor makasare, malays and javanese.

Much before the arrival of Portuguese and Dutch, Timor was part of the

commercial nets politically centered east of Java, after in the Celebes,

and linked by trade to China and India. In documents published during the

Ming dynasty, in 1436, the commercial value of Timor is put in relief and

described as a place where the mountains are covered by trees of

sandalwood producing the country nothing else. One of the first Portuguese

to visit the island, Duarte Barbosa, wrote in 1518: there's an abundance

of sandalwood, white, to which the Muslims in India and Persia give great

value and where much of it is used.

Other products were exported such as honey, wax and slaves, but trade

relied mainly on sandalwood.

Japanese occupation during World War II

During the Second World War, Portugal declared a policy of neutrality.

Dutch and Australian troops nonetheless disembarked at East Timor in

disrespect of Portuguese sovereignty. But the real menace came with the

Japanese invasion, three months later, in February of 1942. The island

became a stage of war between Japanese and the allieds. Timorese were seen

as secondary actors when in truth, after crossing a period of rebellion

against Portuguese rule, were they the more sacrificed during the

resistance until 1945.

In spite of Portugal's policy of neutrality, the Australian and Dutch

troops entered in Timor. It was the first of two foreigner military

invasions. In Lisbon, Oliveira de Salazar denounced the allied disembark as

an invasion of a neutral territory. Shortly after arrived the Japanese.

It's not to admire that J. Santos Carvalho saw in these actions an attitude

of depreciation towards the sovereignty of Portugal. When the allied forces

arrived at Dili in December the 17th of 1941, he says that governor

Ferreira de Carvalho, without means to retaliate by arms ordered the

national flag to be hoisted in all public partitions and buildings of the

colony. To further mark his position of neutrality he confined himself to

his residence and, by free determination, wished to be considered prisoner.

The population of the capital went to live in the interior, mainly in

Aileu, Liquie and Maubara. Some of the few Portuguese that remained in Dili

pursued nevertheless with their usual lives, socializing with the forces

stationed in Timor. They were given instructions by the local government to

maintain a correct attitude but to show no familiarity neither to

collaborate. An atmosphere of normality gain form, and some families were

prepared to go back. It is even reported that an agreement signed by

English and Portuguese governments defined that the allied troops would

retire as soon as arrived a contingent of Portuguese forces from Maputo

(Mozambique).

What happened instead was the Japanese invasion of Dili, in February

of 1942. During January they had managed to occupy Malaysia (except

Singapore), the Philippines (but not Bataan), Borneo and the Celebes,

Birmania, New Guinea and the Salmon islands. Following general L. M.

Chassin - at the end of the second month of an hyperbolic invasion , the

Japanese tide extended itself irresistibly beyond paralyzed and impotent

adversaries. In the middle of February they invaded Sumatra occupying

Palembang, soon after Singapore is attacked and many Englishmen are made

prisoners. Java was surrounded and on the 20th, Bali and Timor were taken.

After a weak resistance , the Dutch troops abandoned by the Javanese

soldiers -- which were in majority --, escaped to the interior leaving

behind armament. Dili was then violently sacked by the Japanese, who found

the city almost uninhabited.

The Portuguese colonial empire

Up to the final years of dictatorship in Portugal, in spite of the

condemnation of UN and the start of the guerrilla warfare in the African

colonies of Angola, Guinea and Mozambique, the Portuguese Colonial Empire

was defended by the government as an heritage of the glorious past and

motive of national pride. However, the crescent expenses of it's

maintenance begun to reflect increasingly on the economy and social tissue

of the metropolis, what provoked crescent discontentment of the population,

finally leading to the Revolution of '74 that installed democracy and gave

independence to the colonies. East Timor was invaded by Indonesia precisely

in the course of decolonization.

During dictatorship, the colonies continued to be dedicated

considerable interest. For the nationalist ideology that characterized the

regime, the vast regions of the World under Portuguese sovereignty were to

be seen as the justification of a necessary conscience of greatness and

pride to be Portuguese.

The expression "Portuguese Colonial Empire" would be generalized and

even met official formalization. Colonial patrimony was considered as the

remaining spoils of the Portuguese conquests of the glorious period of

expansion.

These notions were mystified but also expressed in Law as in 1930

Oliveira de Salazar (at the time minister of Finances and, for some time of

the Colonies) published the Colonial Act. It stated some fundamental

principles for the overseas territorial administration and proclaimed that

it was of the organic essence of the Portuguese nation to possess and

colonize overseas territories and to civilize indigenous populations there

comprised. The overseas dimension of Portugal was however soon put at

stake after World War II. The converging interest of the two victorious

superpowers on the re-distribution of World regions productors of raw

materials contributed for an international agreement on the legal right for

all peoples to their own government. Stated as a fundamental principle of

the UN Charter, anti-colonialism gave thrust to the independist movements

of the colonies, and in matter of time unavoidably accepted by the great

colonial nations: England, France, Netherlands, Belgium. Yet such countries

relied on mechanisms of economical domination that would last, assuring

that political independence wouldn't substantially affect the structure of

trade relations.

Loss of the Indian territories and the reactions. The first problem

that the Portuguese had to deal with was the conflict with the Indian

Union, independent state in 1947. The Indian nationalism had triumphed over

the English occupation, and in 1956 forced the French to abandon their

establishments in 1956. The same was demanded to the Portuguese over their

territories of Goa, Daman and Diu, but in face of refusal. India severed

the diplomatic relations. The passage through Indian territory in order to

reach the two enclaves dependent of Daman was denied since 1954, and

despite the recognition of such right by International Court of Justice

recognized t (1960), Dadr and Nagar Haveli were effectively lost. This was

followed by mass invasions of passive resisters which Portuguese were still

able to hinder until December 19 of 1961, when the Indian Union made

prevail it's superior military force, to obtain final retreat of the

Portuguese.

Goa had been capital of the Portuguese expansion to the East.

Conquered in 1510 by Afonso de Albuquerque, it was also an active center of

religious diffusion to the point of being called the Rome of the Orient. In

spite of it's the historical and spiritual importance, the reactions

against the military attack of the Indian Union parted mainly from official

sectors, and only moderately shared by the public opinion. For the

historian J. Hermano de Saraiva whom we have followed, it reflected the

dominant politic ideologies: at the end of the XIXth century, the

colonizing activity was considered a service rendered to civilization but

since World War II viewed as an attempt to the liberty of the peoples. This

doctrinal involucre of interest to which the Portuguese were completely

strange was rapidly adopted by the intellectual groups, in great part

responsible for the formation of the public opinion. That's how Saraiva

justifies that the protests for the loss of Goa to the Indian Union were

directed less to the foreign power than to the Portuguese authorities, for

not having known to negotiate a modus viviendi acceptable for both parts.

More than that, he detects in this curious reaction a tendency that would

accentuate along the two following decades: the crisis of patriotism. To

defend or to exalt the national values appeared to the bourgeois elites of

the 60's as a provincial attitude, expression of cultural under-

development.

Indonesian invasion

Indonesia invaded the territory in December 1975, relying on US

diplomatic support and arms, used illegally but with secret authorisation

from Washington; new arms shipments were sent under the cover of an

official "embargo".

There was no need to threaten bombing or even sanctions. It would have

sufficed for the US and its allies to withdraw active participation and

inform their associates in the Indonesian military command that the

atrocities must be terminated and the territory granted the right of self-

determination, as upheld by the United Nations and the international court

of justice. We cannot undo the past, but should at least be willing to

recognise what we have done, and face the moral responsibility of saving

the remnants and providing reparations - a small gesture of compensation

for terrible crimes.

Many were immediately killed, while their villages were burned down to

the ground. Others run to the mountains in the heart of their land, and

organized a resistance movement. These brave peasants - and their sons -

have opposed the barbarian indonesian soldiers for 23 years now. Torture,

rape, all kinds of physical, sexual and psychological violations, violent

repression and brutal murder have been the daily life of the Maubere people

(the original people of East Timor) since.

Even before president Habibie's surprise call for a referendum this

year, the army anticipated threats to its rule, including its control over

East Timor's resources, and undertook careful planning with "the aim, quite

simply... to destroy a nation".

The plans were known to western intelligence. The army recruited

thousands of West Timorese and brought in forces from Java. More ominously,

the military command sent units of its dreaded US-trained Kopassus special

forces and, as senior military adviser, General Makarim, a US-trained

intelligence specialist with "a reputation for callous violence".

Terror and destruction began early in the year. The army forces

responsible have been described as "rogue elements" in the west. There is

good reason, however, to accept Bishop Belo's assignment of direct

responsibility to General Wiranto. It appears that the militias have been

managed by elite units of Kopassus, the "crack special forces unit" that

had "been training regularly with US and Australian forces until their

behaviour became too much of an embarrassment for their foreign friends".

These forces adopted the tactics of the US Phoenix programme in the

Vietnam war, which killed tens of thousands of peasants and much of the

indigenous South Vietnamese leadership, as well as "the tactics employed by

the Contras" in Nicaragua. The state terrorists were "not simply going

after the most radical pro-independence people, but... the moderates, the

people who have influence in their community."

Well before the referendum, the commander of the Indonesian military

in Dili, Colonel Tono Suratman, warned of what was to come: "If the pro-

independents do win... all will be destroyed. It will be worse than 23

years ago". An army document of early May, when international agreement on

the referendum was reached, ordered "massacres should be carried out from

village to village after the announcement of the ballot if the pro-

independence supporters win". The independence movement "should be

eliminated from its leadership down to its roots".

Citing diplomatic, church and militia sources, the Australian press

reported that "hundreds of modern assault rifles, grenades and mortars are

being stockpiled, ready for use if the autonomy option is rejected at the

ballot box".

All of this was understood by Indonesia's "foreign friends", who also

knew how to bring the terror to an end, but preferred evasive and ambiguous

reactions that the Indonesian generals could easily interpret as a "green

light" to carry out their work.

The sordid history must be viewed against the background of US-

Indonesia relations in the postwar era. The rich resources of the

archipelago, and its critical strategic location, guaranteed it a central

role in US global planning. These factors lie behind US efforts 40 years

ago to dismantle Indonesia, perceived as too independent and too democratic

- even permitting participation of the poor peasants. These factors account

for western support for the regime of killers and torturers who emerged

from the 1965 coup.

Their achievements were seen as a vindication of Washington's wars in

Indochina, motivated in large part by concerns that the "virus" of

independent nationalism might "infect" Indonesia, to use Kissinger-like

rhetoric.

The recent convulsions inside Indonesia - with its people finally

crying for freedom and democracy - and the Nobel Peace Prize of 1996 -

shared between Bishop Belo, a dominican supporting the Maubere people in

Dili, and Jose Ramos Horta, a politician and activist who represents the

Resistance historic leader, Xanana Gusmao, imprisioned in Indonesia for a

20-year sentence - have brought a new hope to the fight of this martyr

people. Also, economic crisis hitting south-east Asia has shaken the

dictatorship in Jakarta more than ever. The winds of change blowing

throughout Indonesia started to hit East Timor...

Introduction to Indonesia

Indonesia is the country with the more of Muslims in the world which

means 87 per cent of 180 million habitants. Nevertheless, the major part of

the declared Muslims mix their faith in Allah with animistic or Hindu-

Buddhist beliefs. These are reminiscences of the Indian colonization that

would be interrupted with the penetration of Islam in the 16th century,

generally superficial and incomplete.

Due to the insular configuration, composed by 13 677 islands, 3 000

inhabited, and with an approximate extension of 1/8 the perimeter of Earth,

Indonesia faces problems of national unity. Being the fifth most populous

nation, 2/3 are concentrated in only the fifth larger island, Java, where

the density is one of the highest. The solution passes inevitably by birth

control and transmigration to territories such as Papua New Guinea,

recently East Timor but also in between with the evident purpose of

dissolving local cultures in the predominant Javanese which is only one

amongst 360 tribal and ethno-linguistic groups and more than 250 different

languages and dialects.

The Dutch colonial domain had been massively based in Java, with the

rest of the archipelago had developed very unequally. From the rigid

Islamic areas of North Sumatra to the tribes of Borneo or the Christian

islands of the east, a variety of economic and social systems experienced

very distinct problems for their progress.

Independence of Indonesia and Sukarno

At the time of Indonesia's proclamation of independence in 1945,

President Sukarno defined an ideological base for the state -- the "Panca

sila" (meaning "five virtues") -- to be followed by all citizens and sworn

by the social organizations. Main principles imposed were the adoption of

Indonesian "Bahasa" language and the acceptance of one among five religions

-- Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism and Buddhism -- forbidding

the animist cults and other traditional practices. Thus "Panca sila" was

assumed as an instrument of governmental control and a mean to javanize the

diverse cultures.

But not without much internal opposition. Illuded with the possibility

of the creation of an official Islamic state, when Suharto reached to

power, Communist administrators and Islamic movements supported the

Revolution, but what they didn't expect was the minor concessions offered,

and once annihilated the Communist Party, an important preoccupation of

the government has been to control, domesticate or destroy the most

orthodox and active Muslim factions (Prof. A. Barbedo de Magalhes, Oporto

University). Since then they oftenly erupt in riots against the military

aristocracy, basically syncretic in matter of religion.

Besides reaffirming the "Panca sila", in 1982 Suharto introduced the

Law of the Associations which would fasten the strain on political,

religious and social associations as it increased the powers of the

administration to dismiss or impute directors to the aggregations, to

destroy or agglutinate them in others more vast and controlled by the

militaries.

Social and Political instability is patent in public insurrections in

favor of democracy, which in September of 1984 culminated with the killing

of 60 Muslims and imprisonment of important personalities such as of former

governors that defied an inquiry to the incident.

Neo-colonialism in Indonesia? Many authors mention that Sukarno had a

dream: the formation of a great Indonesia comprising the totality of the

ancient Dutch East Indies, inclusive the non-Indonesian population. For

this reason had he renounced to the federate structures initially conceived

for the creation of the United States of Indonesia -- thus betraying the

agreement with the Dutch for the transfer of sovereignty --, in favor of an

unitary constitution, although still provisional. The new direction was

taken in August of 1950, three months after an unilateral declaration of

independence by the South Moluccas.

The first elections, free and democratic in fact, would be held in

1955, but disputed by more or less 170 parties! Their differences naturally

brought difficulties to the functioning of the parliamentary democracy. On

one hand, between the exponents of pre-Islamic syncretism of the "Nahdatul

Ulama" (NU) and the orthodox Moslems of the "Masyumi", which's vital

strength came from the outside -- West Sumatra and North Celebes besides

Occidental Java (Sundanese ethnic origin). On the other hand, between the

Nationalist Party (PNI) and the Communist Party (PKI), based in Java, and

these with the Moslems.

The inefficiency of the administration, which passed through seven

governments since 1949 to '57, and the rivalry engaged by the parties

alone, in contrast with the heroism of the Revolution of August 17th, after

all, the concentration of decision and power in Java as restrictor of the

economic, social and cultural development aroused at the end tension in the

exterior islands.

In February of 1957, Sukarno criticized the Western liberal democracy

because unadapted to Indonesian particularity. He interfered more in the

constitutional processes and appeals to his concept of "Guided Democracy",

founded on indigenous procedures: the important questions should be decided

through prolonged deliberations ("musyawarah") in order to obtain consensus

("mukafat"). This was the practice in the village and the same model ought

to be adopted for the nation. Sukarno proposed a government formed by the

four main parties and a national council represented by parties and

functional groups in which, under the guidance of the president (himself),

consensus would express itself.

In spite of the charisma gained by Sukarno as father of the country

and mentor of the principle "unity in diversity", he was unable to avoid

the proclamations of the martial law in March of 1957 as a response to the

regional dissidences which reached their peak.

At the end of the year a further set-back was brought by the defeat of

a motion for the renewal of negotiations concerning the destiny of West New

Guinea. In a series of direct actions across the country, Dutch property

was seized with the Indonesian government taking over. In the beginning of

1958 West Sumatra claimed for the constitution of a new central government

under the leadership of Hatta, a moderate and historic figure of the

Revolution, from the start vice-president of Sukarno up until two years ago

when he resigned because disagreeing with his policy. Ignored the appeal of

the Sumatrese a new revolutionary government was formed, supported by

leaders of the Masyumi Party, including the ex-Prime Ministers Natsir

(September 1950 -- March '51) and Harahap (August '55 -- March '56). The

military commandant of the North Celebes joined the initiative, yet most

striking was CIA's assistance with armament including aircrafts.

Suppression of the revolt was nevertheless soon accomplished, and with

the regions undermined, the parties discredited and the prestige of the

victorious army elevated, Sukarno resumed the idea of Guided Democracy in

partnership with the military. Meanwhile, the army chief of staff A.

Nasution had committed himself to the thought that the return to the

revolutionary constitution of 1945 (presidential-type) would offer the best

means for implementing the principles of deliberation, consensus and

functional representation. Sukarno urged this course in a speech to the

Constituent Assembly, elected in 1955 to draft a permanent constitution.

Despite failing the approval of the necessary two-thirds for majority, he

introduced it through a presidential decree of dubious legality.

Indonesia's domestic as well as foreign diplomacy is difficult to

conceive in terms other than in the context of neo-colonialism. It

certainly is incompatible with the spirit of the Afro-Asian Conference of

Bandung held in Java, in 1955. Among twenty nine countries consensus was

reached in order to condemn colonialism in all it's forms of

manifestation. As it seems, imperialism isn't condemnable so long the

territories comes from an ancient colony. Like the annexation of the

Moluccan islands (1950-52) and in 1969 the also former Dutch West New

Guinea, long pretended. The last was integrated after an Act of Free Choice

sanctioned by UN. In truth, many journalists and observers would consider

the process orchestrated but it had already been sealed. Today it is

remembered as perhaps the most unfortunate episode UN's history.

In both regions, as well as in other islands of the Pacific,

population claim Melanesian ancestrality, not identifying themselves with

Indonesia, predominantly Malaysian.

The country has always been tormented by regional rebellions. From the

perpetrated by Islamic fundamentalist movements, even in Java (where in the

district of Acheh, a Moslem state practically subsisted between 1948 and

1962), Sumatra and Celebes as we've seen but also Kalimantan, to those

involving Christian groups as in the South Moluccas. Still in 1984 the

Movement for the Liberation of Papua erupted in attacks against the main

cities of the territory, hoisting their flag in the capital opposite to the

Regional Parliament.

The power of Sukarno depended along the years of the preservation of

the equilibrium between the army and the Communist Party (PKI). The period

assisted to the crescent popularity of the communists due to the consistent

protection moved by the President in face of the incursions of the

militaries. he opposed to the prohibitions of congresses and editorials,

banished political organizations patronized by the military to blacken the

PKI, placing some of their militants in political posts. Many analysts

think that Sukarno was preparing the path for the rise of the communists to

the power. Others say that his action intended to assure a the permanently

threatened equilibrium

The coup of Suharto and the military. On the night of September 30,

1965, a group of subaltern officials based at Halim Air Base attempted a

coup d'tat to anticipate what they alleged to be the take-over of a pro-

Western council of generals. But by following morning the Strategic Reserve

of the Army Forces (KOSTRAD), commanded by Suharto, had concluded a

successful counter-attack. For specialist Benedict Anderson, of Cornell

University, it seems odd that Suharto, who would gather the reins of power

into his hands, hadn't been aimed at by the "30th of September Movement"

which assassinated six army generals (while a seventh, A. Nasution,

escaped).

With propaganda that implicated important nationalist and communist

politicians in the first stroke and the estimulation of the widely spread

resentment of the pro-Chinese PKI was object of among the Indonesian

Islamic groups, the militaries gradually assumed power. Suharto begun to

maintain the already wasted and sickened Sukarno in a fictional presidency,

as a symbol of national unity until by decree emptying his legal authority,

in March 11, 1966. The next semester would be fatal for more than half a

million Chinese and Indonesian besides an excess of 200 thousand political

prisoners which altogether formed one of the greatest Communist parties of

the World. The wave of hysteria was such that they were pointed out and

oftenly even executed by their proper neighbor civilians in the villages.

Formation of East-Timorese political associations

During Portuguese dictatorship, civilians were prohibited to gather

for political discussions. But since the 60's an educated elite with

nationalist aspirations begun to reune clandistinely and vehicle some

principles in catholic press. Three weeks after the democratic Revolution,

formation of political associations was incentivated, in the process of

decolonization. Immediatly UDT was founded, wanting to prolong Portugal's

presence in view of a progressive autonomy. ASDT, future Fretilin, called

for radical independence, while Apodeti, supported by Indonesia, for the

integration of East Timor in the neighbour power.

Although the changes acrossing the metropolis were of little immediate

effect in the rural society, they had profound impact among the elites of

East Timor, particularly in the administrator sectors, centered in the

cities and specially in Dili They polarized the opposition to certain

aspects of the Portuguese rule.

Since the 60s, an educated elite with nationalist aspirations began to

emerge, often product of the catholic schools and particularly from the

seminaries of Dare (outside Dili) and S. Jose in the colony of Macao.

Discussions involved small groups of students and administrators that

gathered clandestinely in the capital. The main escapes of their ideas were

catholic publications of reduced circulation like Seara, which was closed

down by the political police PIDE.

The conclusions reached are considered general and vagrant. Subjects

like traditional marriage and the educational system were debated but not

much was proposed as a global critic and alternatives.

Anyhow, this collective of student-administrators and higher level

bureaucrats, as well as important rural proprietors would constitute the

basis of the two main political parties: UDT and ASDT/Fretilin.

Three weeks after the Revolution 25th of April, the Governor of East

Timor created the Commission for the Autodetermination which's intentions

were to bring out to legality all the incipient political associations.

The parties

UDT (Timor Democratic Union). This became the first party, was also

the most popular for some months. The initial declaration, of May 11th,

made apology of democratic principles, distribution of revenues and, the

fulcral aspect, a progressive autonomy materialized with an increasing

participation of the Timorese but always in the light of the Portuguese

flag, to culminate with the integration of East Timor in a Portuguese

language community. The political platform as conceived by first president

Mrio Carrascalo was to hold Portugal's presence as far as possible

without putting aside the option for independence. But although having

presented a cohesive front at start, the course of events in the months

followed would evidence different susceptibilities towards a same problem.

Firmly based on two groups, the higher positioned administrator elite

and the larger proprietors of coffee plantations. UDT accounted still the

favours of many suco liurais, although the majority of these belonged to

the circle of the imposed chiefs, in an ancient practice of the colonial

government to substitute the legitimate when less malleable... They used

their influence to gain support for the party in the countryside managing

strong implantation in areas like Liquie, Maubara, Maubisse, Ainaro,

Manatuto, Laclubar.

While a group of conservatives were granted support by traditional

chiefs and administrators -- whose positions and privileges under

Portuguese rule made them emphasize a continuation with the metropolis --,

those with commercial preoccupations of economical diversification beyond

the Portuguese orbit focused on the advantages of independence.

Not until 27 of July did the MFA in Lisbon determine the new

orientation in relation with the colonial territories. By it, the Timorese

were officially and for the first time confronted with the possibility of

independence.

In a message to the Portuguese President, UDT still inquired about the

viability of federation, but no further elucidation was obtained. Few days

later, UDT published the provisional statutes where preconized

autodetermination oriented to federation with Portugal, with an

intermediate phase for obtention of independence, and rejecting integration

in any potential foreign country. It is probable that the discouragement of

a definite bind with Portugal had also to do with the winds of independence

that blew from the ancient metropolis. Spreading throughout the African

colonies, in East Timor it influenced a crescent opposing party of

independist militancy that defied UDT's hesitations: ASDT.

Amongst UDT founders pontificated the mentioned Mario Carrascalo,

proprietor of coffee plantations, director of the Agriculture Services, and

also former leader of caetanist party ANP (Popular National Association),

the only one allowed. Ex-seminarist Lopes da Cruz was too a ANP member and

director of Timor's journal, A Voz de Timor, patronized by the government.

He and intellectual Domingos de Oliveira were custom officials. Cesar

Mouzinho was Mayor of Dili.

ASDT/Fretilin (Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor). The

plan of ASDT was acknowledged in the proper day of it's foundation, 20th of

May. Adopting the doctrines of socialism and democracy it called upfront

for a gradual independence preceded of administrator, economical, social

and political reforms. Three to eight years was the period of transition

considered necessary. And from the beginning with the participation of the

Timorese in the administration.

In the majority, ASDT was constituted with recent recruited members of

the urbane elites, mainly those living in Dli, which maintained the link

to the rural areas of where they came from. Some were even descendants of

liurai families.

With an average age under 30, the elder Xavier do Amaral, of 37,

became ASDT's chairman. The leaders were commited to nationalism and

reaffirmation of the Timorese culture, agreed on the priority of

agricultural development, on alphabetization and extensive health

programmes. But furthermore, the political perspectives deferred. The

dominating tendency between the founders of ASDT was clearly social-

democratic, represented by men like journalist Ramos-Horta, administrator

Alarico Fernandes, Justino Mota and former professor Xavier do Amaral.

Ramos-Horta says that for him and the majority of his colleagues it

represented social justice, equitative distribution of the country's

wealth, a mixed economy and a parliamentary system with extended democratic

liberties. As to what extent did they have a model, sociologist John G.

Taylor mentions the social-democracy of the 60 and 70's in Austria and

Scandinavia. Anyway it wasn't experimented, as the urgency to gain internal

and foreign support seems to have kept on depriving the opportunity.

Still during the ASDT period, a secondary current leaded by ancient

sergeant and administrator, also ex-seminarist, Nicolau Lobato, combined a

fervent anticolonial nationalism with notions of economical and political

development self-reliance based upon the experiences of Angola and

Mozambique. His ideas would begin to prevail after the transformation of

ASDT into FRETILIN.

Apodeti (Timorese Popular Democratic Association). In 25 of May a

third party appeared under the designation of Association for the

Integration of Timor in Indonesia. Renamed Apodeti, the manifesto of the

party defended an integration with autonomy in the Republic of Indonesia in

accordance to the International Law and principles such as the obligatory

teaching of the Indonesian language (Indonesian Bahasa), free education and

medical assistance, and the right to go on strike.

The visionaries of Apodeti parted from the assumption that Portugal

would abandon East Timor and that the idea of independence couldn't stand a

chance because of Indonesia. In reality, the revindication of autonomy in a

process of integration appeared more as a popular measure and than as a

political stand.

It has been written that in the beginning of the 60's, BAKIN (military

co-ordinator agency of the secret intelligence INTEL), mounted a net in

East Timor which dealed with merchants, custom-house functionaries and

agents from the Indonesian consulate of Dili, in change of favours,

payments and refuge in case of conflict. Among them, those who would become

the prominent leaders of Apodeti: professor and administrator Osrio

Soares, liurai of Atsabe (near the boarder of Indonesian Timor) Guilherme

Gonzalves, and cattle breeder Arnaldo dos Reis Arajo.

Still before the Portuguese Revolution, BAKIN had trained East-

timoreses in radio transmissions and as interpreters.

Nevertheless, while UDT and ASDT/Fretilin rapidly reached to the

thousands of adepts, Apodeti wouldn't reach more than a couple of hundreds

during the whole year of '74.

The support came mainly from the sucos of Guilherme Atsabe and a small

Muslim community of Dili. Besides this it had no expression. The dubious

personalities of it's leaders, all with criminal record and their political

purposes made Apodeti in the words of East Timor's last governor, J. Lemos

Pires an enclosed organization, with difficulties to dialogue with the

people and government even worse with the opponent parties. Fretilin

considered Apodeti illegal.

Three minor parties appeared, all more or less insignificant. The KOTA

(Klibur Oan Timur Aswain), meaning "sons of the mountain warriors", was

filiated in the Popular Monarchical Party of the metropolis. Remounting

it's origins to the Topasses (see Ethnology of the Timorese), KOTA

postulated the restoration of powers to the liurais who could trace their

ancestrality back to the Topasse period in order to constitute a democratic

monarchy, with the king to be elected amongst the liurais. Like KOTA, the

Timorese Democratic Labour Movement hadn't a programme and agrouped only

eight members, all from the same family. They wished to mobilize the

working class. The Democratic Association for the integration of East Timor

in Australia received money for promises of integration in Australia. It's

existence was ephemerous because the Australian government departed from

the idea even before the end of 1974.

Of these parties, KOTA and the Labour party were further mentioned and

precisely by the Indonesian authorities with the sole purpose to evoke that

four of the five parties, which they alleged that was the majority of the

East-timorese, had petitioned for integration during the Civil War

On 15 September the United Nations Security Council unanimously

authorised the establishment of a multinational force in Timor (UNSCR

1264). The resolution gives the force three tasks for its mandate: first,

to restore peace and security to East Timor; second to protect and support

the United Nations Mission in East Timor and; third, to facilitate within

force capabilities humanitarian assistance operations in East Timor. The

multinational force is commanded by Australias Major General Peter

Cosgrove

Australian support

The multinational force has been authorised by the United Nations

Security Council, under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, to use

all necessary measures to achieve its mandate. The multinational force

would prepare the ground for the United Nations to complete its task of

managing East Timor's transition to independence. This will involve the

arrival as soon as possible of a fully-fledged blue helmet UN peacekeeping

operation and the establishment of a UN transitional administration.

Australian support for peacekeeping operations is not something new

Bougainville is but one ongoing example. But the East Timor operation

multilateral in scope, strongly representing South East Asia, led by

Australia and conducted under a United Nations Chapter VII or peace

enforcement mandate is of a very different nature. This is the first time

that Australia has been asked by the United Nations to build and lead a

multinational force and to provide the largest single component. When

Australias deployment was at full strength, it had committed 4,500 troops.

Australian involvement in the East Timor crisis is not motivated by

any desire to cause difficulties in relations between Australia and

Indonesia. It is important that Australia is in East Timor at the request

of the United Nations and with the agreement of the Indonesian Government.

It was in Australias vital interests that Indonesia be a peaceful, stable

and democratic state, economically prosperous and playing a leading and

respected role in the region. It was also in Indonesias own interests to

ensure East Timors transition is a peaceful and orderly one. Australias

efforts in building the relations with Indonesia were directed to that

outcome.

With respect to defence relations, it is in australian security

interests to have links such as defence attache representation, high-level

strategic talks, staff college courses, maritime surveillance and disaster

relief exercises. Such contacts are necessary to achieve the objectives in

East Timor, and are desirable because defence links will be part of any

effective long-term relationship with Indonesia. That decision shows the

challenges Jakarta and Canberra face in maintaining a working defence

relationship that supports the long-term national and strategic interests

of both countries.

Prime Minister Howard has said that the deployment of Australian

troops to East Timor meets the test of national interest in two respects.

First, in the spirit of Australia's military tradition, troops are going to

defend what Australian society believes to be right. The troops are not

going to occupy territory, to impose the will of Australia on others or to

act against the legitimate interests of another country. Rather, they go to

East Timor at the request of the United Nations and with the agreement of

the Indonesian government. INTERFET troops are defending East Timors

desire for independence, as delivered in a free vote granted to them by the

Indonesian Government and with the blessing of the international community.

In addition, INTERFET troops will facilitate the humanitarian relief that

is so desperately needed for the hundreds of thousands of displaced people

in East Timor.

Second, Australian troops in East Timor will work to put an end to the

terrible violence that prevailed immediately after the result of the ballot

was announced. Apart from the human cost, the scale of violence we

witnessed undermines Australia's own interest in a stable region. The

troops will prepare the way for the United Nations to undertake the vital

task of developing a transitional political and administrative framework

for East Timor. For East Timorese, this offers the hope of reconciliation

among groups that have fought each other for decades and the opportunity to

create their own future. They have a responsibility to come to grips with

these issues. For Indonesia, it will more readily be able to concentrate on

its nation building task, with the full support of the international

community.

USA admits Timorese right to self-determination

On a letter to Senator Russel Feingold, dated December 27th, 1996,

U.S. President Bill Clinton recognized, for the first time, that he "noted

with interest your [a group of 15 U.S. Senators] support of a UN-sponsored

self-determination referendum in East Timor".

Indonesia admits independence

For the first time in 23 years, Indonesia has admitted the right of

the Timorese people to indepence. Last January, on the eve of another high-

level bilateral summit on East Timor between the Portuguese and Indonesian

Foreign Ministers, at the United Nations' headquarters in New Yourk, the

Indonesian authorities stated that if the East Timorese rejected the

current authonomy plan offered by Indonesia, the central government in

Jakarta would be ready to let them separate from their invadors.

Only a couple of weeks later, president B.J. Habibie announced, at a

meeting with indonesian businessmen at the Chamber of Commerce, that by

January 1st, 2000 the problem of East Timor would be 'fixed': either the

Timorese accepted the "large-scale authonomy" proposed by the Indonesian

government in New York (August 5th, 1998), or Indonesia "would wave them

goodbye". It was the first time the Indonesian authorities openly talked of

independence for East Timor.

Meanwhile, the situation on the territory has worsened in the last

months, followin the alleged massacre at Alas (south of Dili) last

December, when as much as 52 people would have been killed. The military

(18,000 soldiers currently serve in the occupied territory, according to

intelligence data smuggled out of East Timor by a dicident officer - that

is, 1 for each 40 East Timorese, or proportionally 7 times more than in the

rest of Indonesia) have been arming civilian militia, in what international

observers consider to be a move aimed at starting a civil war on the verge

of Indonesia's leave.

Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portugese Republic on

the Question of East Timor

The Governments of Indonesia and Portugal, recalling General Assembly

resolutions and the relevant resolutions and decisions adopted by the

Security Council and the General Assembly on the question of East Timor;

bearing in mind the sustained efforts of the Governments of Indonesia and

Portugal since July 1983, through the good offices of the Secretary-

General, to find a just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable

solution to the question of East Timor; recalling the agreement of 5 August

1998 to undertake, under the auspices of the Secretary-General,

negotiations on a special status based on a wide-ranging autonomy for East

Timor without prejudice to the positions of principle of the respective

Governments on the final status of East Timor; having discussed a

constitutional framework for an autonomy for East Timor on the basis of a

draft presented by the United Nations, as amended by the Indonesian

Government; noting the position of the Government of Indonesia that the

proposed special autonomy should be implemented only as an end solution to

the question of East Timor with full recognition of Indonesian sovereignty

over East Timor; noting the position of the Government of Portugal that an

autonomy regime should be transitional, not requiring recognition of

Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor or the removal of East Timor from

the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the General Assembly, pending

a final decision on the status of East Timor by the East Timorese people

through an act of self-determination under United Notions auspices; taking

into account that although the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal each

have their positions of principle on the prepared proposal for special

autonomy, both agree that it is essential to move the peace process

forward, and that therefore, the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal

agree that the Secretary-General should consult the East Timorese people on

the constitutional framework for autonomy attached hereto as an annex;

bearing in mind that the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal requested

the Secretary-General to devise the method and procedures for the popular

consultation through a direct, secret and universal ballot signed up in New

York on this 5th day of May, 1999 the Agreement Between the Republic of

Indonesia and the Portugese Republic on the Question of East Timor

Article 1 Request the Secretary-General to put the attached proposed

constitutional framework providing for a special autonomy for East Timor

within the unitary Republic of Indonesia to the East Timorese people, both

inside and outside East Timor, for their consideration and acceptance or

rejection through a popular consultation on the basis of a direct, secret

and universal ballot.

Article 2 Request the Secretary-General to establish, immediately after the

signing of this Agreement, an appropriate United Nations mission in East

Timor to enable him to effectively carry out the popular consultation.

Article 3 The Government of Indonesia will be responsible for maintaining

peace and security in East Timor in order to ensure that the popular

consultation is carried out in a fair and peaceful way in an atmosphere

free of intimidation, violence or interference from any side.

Article 4 Request the Secretary-General to report the result of the popular

consultation to the Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as

to inform the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the East Timorese

people.

Article 5 If the Secretary-General determines, on the basis of the result

of the popular consultation and in accordance with this Agreement, that,

the proposed constitutional framework for special autonomy is acceptable to

the East Timorese people, the Government of Indonesia shall initiate the

constitutional measures necessary for the implementation of the

constitutional framework, and the Government of Portugal shall initiate

within the United Nations the procedures necessary for the removal of East

Timor from the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the General

Assembly and the deletion of the question of East Timor from the agendas of

the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Article 6 If the Secretary-General determines, on the basis of the result

of the popular consultation and in accordance with this Agreement, that the

proposed constitutional framework for special autonomy is not acceptable to

the East Timorese people, the Government of Indonesia shall take the

constitutional steps necessary to terminate its links with East Timor thus

restoring under Indonesian law the status East Timor held prior to 17 July

1976, and the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the Secretary-

General shall agree on arrangements for a peaceful and orderly transfer of

authority in East Timor to the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall,

subject to the appropriate legislative mandate, initiate the procedure

enabling East Timor to begin a process of transition towards independence.

Article 7 During the interim period between the conclusion of the popular

consultation and the start of the implementation of either option, the

parties request the Secretary-General to maintain an adequate United

Nations presence in East Timor.

Conclusion

On August, 30th, History was written in East Timor: 98.6% of

registered voters exercised their democratic right in a UN-organised

referendum, considered by the Indonesian authorities as "free and fair".

Defying eight months of intimidation by indonesian-armed militiamen, mostly

transmigrated from West Timor, the population stood in long queues at the

ballot sites, in some cases waiting hours in the sun after walking

kilometres to the nearest polling station.

Hardly anybody partied in Dili, though, or in the rest of the

territory; celebrations were held abroad, though, in Australia, Portugal,

the United States, Ireland, England, Mozambique, even Indonesia, wherever a

Timorese community is to be found. But inside the new Nation, just four

hours after the official announcement, the defeated militia gangs started

to set East Timor on fire. BBC, CNN, and other international TV stations

broadcasted to the world images once seen in other war scenarios - fire of

automatic weapons, houses set on fire, innocent civilians seeking shelter

in the schools, the churches, the neighbouring mountains. International

media reports mentioned 145 deaths in Dili only, in the 48 hours following

the announcement. On September, 5th and 6th, most international observers,

journalists and the civilian personnel of UNAMET were evacuated from the

territory, either by chartered planes or the Australian Air Force. On the

afternoon of September, the 5th, four indonesian ministers - including

Defence and Foreign Affairs holders, General Wiranto and Mr. Ali Alatas -

and one secretary of State paid a 4-hour visit to Dili - though they never

left the airport "for security reasons".

On the evening of that same day, the UN Security Council, gathered on

an emergency meeting in New York, once more abstained from sending in a

peace-keeping force. The Indonesian authorities claimed to be able to

restore peace and tranquility, though 20.000 men already stationed in the

territory failed to do so until now, and were even reported to have

participated, in some cases directly, in the new mass killings started on

September, 4th. TV, photographic and oral evidence from UNAMET staff and

international media wasn't enough, so the Council decided to send a "fact-

finding mission" to Jakarta.

On the morning of September, the 6th, the home of Nobel Peace Prize

winner, Ximenes Belo, was set on fire. The bishop seaked refugee in Baucau,

though he was impotent to save the hundreds of refugees in his frontyard,

now facing death or deportation to West Timor, like so many before them.

More than 1,000 refugees were sheltered at the UNAMET compound in Dili, and

the UN convoys were shot at in the road to the airport.

Despite several United Nations Resolutions on the right of the

Timorese to self-determination (the UN has never recognized the indonesian

annexation of the territory), the international community has been blind to

the fight of its inhabitants. Only since November 12th, 1991, when more

than 250 youngsters were killed during a brutal massacre occurred in a

cematery in Dili (the capital city of East Timor), have the "civilized"

nations condemned Indonesia in a more consistent way. But words of

condemnation sound empty when the same countries sell arms to the regime (a

dictatorship ruling Indonesia for decades), and strengthen the economic

ties binding European and American states to Jakarta.

The five days which mediated until official results were announced

were days of tension, with frequent militia attacks in Dili and other spots

in the territory. But on the morning of September, 4th, UNAMET (United

Nations Assistance Mission to East Timor) leader Ian Martin announced the

results, minutes after the United Nations' Secretary-General, Kofi Annan,

had done the same in New York: 21.5% of the voters had chosen to accept the

Special Autonomy offered to the territory by Indonesia, while an

overwhelming majority of 78.5% reffused it, thus laying the path to

independence.

The sources

. Aditjondro, George J In The Shadow of Mount Ramelau: The Impact of the

Occupation of East Timor, The Netherlands, 1994

. Aubrey, Jim Free East Timor Australias Culpability in East Timors

Genocide. Vintage Random House Australia

. Carey, P & GC Bentley East Timor at the Crossroads, The Forging of a

Nation, Cassell, NY, 1995

. CIIR/IPJET International Law and the Question of East Timor, London, 1995

. Cox, Steve Generations of Resistance: East Timor, Cassell, UK, 1995

. Dunn, James 1. East Timor - the Balibo Incident in Perspective, Sydney,

1995

. Timor: A People Betrayed , ABC Books, Sydney, 1996

. East Timor: No Solutions Without respect for Human Rights: Bi-Annual

Report of Human Rights Violations, January to June 1998

. Violence by the State Against Women in East Timor: A Report to the UN

Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Including its Clauses and

Consequences

. East Timorese Political Prisoners

. Breaking the Cycle of Human Rights Violations in East Timor: Annual

Report of Human Rights Violations in East Timor 1997

. Hobart East Timor Committee Hobart East Timor Committee Papers, 1998

Jardine, Matthew

. Ramos Horta, Jose, International Perspectives on Children of War, Family

and Conciliation Courts Review Vol 36 No 3 July 1998

. Salla, Michael E, Creating the 'Ripe Moment' in the East Timor Conflict,

Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 34, No. 4, November 1997

. ETAN/US - Pamphlets/Reports NY,USA

. Indonesia and East Timor: On the verge of change? Charles Scheiner,

Matthew Jardine & Sidhawati ETAN, Global Exchange & Justice for All,

April 1998





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